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SOCIAL PREFERENCES AND THE RESPONSE TO
INCENTIVES: EVIDENCE FROM PERSONNEL DATA*
ORIANA BANDIERA
IWAN BARANKAY
IMRAN RASUL
We present evidence on whether workers have social preferences by compar-
ing workers’ productivity under relative incentives, where individual effort im-
poses a negative externality on others, with their productivity under piece rates,
where it does not. We find that the productivity of the average worker is at least
50 percent higher under piece rates than under relative incentives. We show that
this is due to workers partially internalizing the negative externality their effort
imposes on others under relative incentives, especially when working alongside
their friends. Under piece rates, the relationship among workers does not affect
productivity. Further analysis reveals that workers internalize the externality
only when they can monitor others and be monitored. This rules out pure altruism
as the underlying motive of workers’ behavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper uses personnel data to present evidence on social
preferences in the workplace, namely on whether workers inter-
nalize the effects of their behavior on their colleagues. While
extensive evidence from experimental economics indicates that
individuals take account of the effect of their actions on others in
laboratory games, whether individuals exhibit social preferences
in the workplace is largely unknown. The issue is of great prac-
tical relevance since workers’ productivity under several incen-
tive schemes, such as relative performance evaluation and team
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pay, depends crucially on whether and to what extent they inter-
nalize the effects of their actions on coworkers’ payoffs.1
We use detailed personnel data from a leading farm in the
United Kingdom that first paid its workforce according to a rela-
tive incentive scheme and then switched to piece rates. The
workers’ task is to pick fruit, and their individual productivity is
recorded daily. To identify whether workers have social prefer-
ences, we compare their productivity under relative incentives to
their productivity under piece rates. Under relative incentives,
workers’ daily pay depends on the ratio of individual productivity
to average productivity among all coworkers on the same field
and day. In contrast, under piece rates individual pay only de-
pends on individual productivity.
The comparison is revealing because under relative incen-
tives individual effort imposes a negative externality on cowork-
ers’ pay, whereas under piece rates individual effort has no effect
on others’ pay. The difference in workers’ performance under the
two schemes, if any, then provides evidence on whether and to
what extent workers internalize the externality they impose on
their colleagues.
It is important to stress that social preferences can be
thought of as a reduced-form representation of either altruism or
collusion. Namely, workers might internalize the externality ei-
ther because they truly care about colleagues’ payoffs, or because
they fear punishment and retaliation. In this paper we first
analyze whether workers internalize the externality their effort
imposes on others, and then shed light on their underlying
motives.
The empirical analysis proceeds in four stages. First, we
identify the causal effect of the change in incentive schemes on
workers’ productivity. Second, we derive the empirical distribu-
tion of social preferences that is consistent with the observed
change in productivity across incentive schemes. Third, we ana-
lyze whether the extent to which workers internalize the exter-
nality depends on the relationship between coworkers. To address
this issue, we use data from a survey we administered to workers
to collect precise information on their social network of friends on
the farm. Fourth, we present evidence to distinguish between two
1. See Fehr and Gächter [2000a] for an overview of the experimental evidence
on social preferences. That human relations matter in the workplace has long
been noted in the sociology literature [Mayo 1933; Roy 1952], and the organiza-
tional behavior literature (see Williams and O’Reilly [1998] for a review).
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hypotheses on why workers behave as if they have social prefer-
ences—pure altruism and collusion.
The data have four key features that help identify the causal
effect of the change in incentive schemes on worker productivity,
to attribute this change to workers’ reaction to the externality
created by the relative incentives scheme, and to investigate the
motives behind the workers’ behavior. First, we observe the daily
productivity of the same workers before and after the introduc-
tion of piece rates. Time-invariant sources of unobservable indi-
vidual heterogeneity are, therefore, controlled for.
Second, the same workers face an identical work environ-
ment throughout, except for the change in incentive schemes. In
particular, there is no endogenous sorting of new workers into the
sample and no endogenous attrition of workers out of the sample.
Moreover, tasks, technology, management, and other farm prac-
tices were the same under both incentive schemes.
Third, the group of coworkers each individual works with,
changes on a daily basis. This allows us to identify the effect of
group composition on worker productivity from the comparison of
the behavior of the same worker working alongside different
coworkers.
Fourth, we observe a subsample of the same workers using
an alternative technology that does not allow monitoring of co-
workers. The ability to monitor coworkers creates differences in
observed behavior depending on whether workers cooperate be-
cause of collusion or pure altruism. The comparison of workers’
responses to the introduction of piece rates under the two moni-
toring scenarios then provides evidence to distinguish between
collusion and pure altruism.
We find that the change in incentive scheme had a significant
and permanent impact on productivity. For the average worker,
productivity increased by at least 50 percent moving from relative
incentives to piece rates. Calibration of the first-order conditions
for worker’s efforts reveals that the observed change in produc-
tivity is too large to be consistent with the assumption that
workers ignore the negative externality they impose on others. At
the same time, the observed change in productivity is also too
small to be consistent with the assumption that workers maxi-
mize the welfare of the group and fully internalize the negative
externality.
We, therefore, posit that workers place some weight on the
payoffs accruing to their coworkers and derive the distribution of
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social preferences among workers that fits the observed change in
productivity. We find that this is consistent with the average
worker placing a weight of .65 on the benefits accruing to all other
coworkers, assuming that they place a weight of one on their own
benefits. Further analysis reveals that under relative incentives
workers internalize the externality more when the share of their
personal friends in the group is larger and this effect is stronger
in smaller groups. In line with the interpretation that social
preferences explain the difference in productivity across the two
schemes, we find that the relationship among workers does not
affect productivity under piece rates.
Finally, we find that productivity under relative incentives
was significantly lower only when workers were able to monitor
each other. Given that monitoring is necessary to enforce collu-
sion while it does not affect altruism, we take this finding to
support the hypothesis that workers are able to sustain implicit
collusive agreements when relative incentives are in place.
Overall, our findings imply that worker productivity is sig-
nificantly different under the two schemes because workers in-
ternalize the externality they impose on others under relative
incentives, and they do so more when they work alongside
friends. Importantly, workers internalize the externality only
when they are able to monitor each other, which rules out pure
altruism as the underlying cause of workers’ behavior.
The results demonstrate the importance of understanding
how workers behave in the presence of externalities on cowork-
ers, when designing incentive schemes. For instance, the results
speak to Lazear’s [1989] observation on how rarely workers are
compensated according to rank-order tournaments, despite the
fact that theory suggests they may have desirable incentive ef-
fects [Lazear and Rosen 1981]. One reason why such schemes
may not be observed in practice is that they lower productivity
when workers behave as if they have social preferences.
The paper contributes to two strands of the literature. First,
we contribute to the literature on incentive schemes and workers’
productivity [Prendergast 1999].2 We complement existing re-
2. Knoeber and Thurman [1994] analyze the effects of two different relative
incentive schemes on chicken ranchers. The predictions of rank order tournament
theory, a type of relative incentive, have been examined in experimental data
[Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 1987] and sports tournaments [Ehrenberg and Bog-
nanno 1990; Becker and Huselid 1992]. Lazear [2000], Paarsch and Shearer
[1996], and Shearer [2004], find sizable productivity gains moving from fixed pay
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sults by providing the first evidence on the comparison between
relative incentives and piece rates. Our work is also closely re-
lated to Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan [2003], who present
evidence suggesting that productivity is higher under team pay,
where workers’ effort imposes a positive externality on others,
than under piece rates. Consistent with their results, we find that
productivity is lower under relative incentives where the exter-
nality is negative.
Second, our results complement the large experimental lit-
erature on social preferences, showing that these matter outside
the laboratory. In particular, our findings are in line with the
experimental literature on public good games where individual
contributions are generally found to be halfway between the
selfish Nash equilibrium (complete free riding) and the group
optimum [Ledyard 1995; Fehr and Gächter 2000b].
The paper is organized as follows. Section II models the
workers’ effort choice under relative incentives and piece rates.
Section III describes the data. Section IV presents reduced-form
estimates of the effect of the change in incentives on productivity.
Section V brings alternative structural models of workers’ behav-
ior to the data and derives the distribution of social preferences
that are consistent with the observed change in productivity.
Section VI analyzes the effect of the identity of coworkers on
productivity under the two incentive schemes. Section VII pro-
vides evidence to distinguish between pure altruism and collu-
sion. Section VIII concludes with a discussion on the design of
incentive schemes when workers have social preferences.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This section makes precise how social preferences affect
workers’ effort choice under relative incentives and under piece
rates. Theory suggests that relative schemes have the advantage
of differencing out common shocks to productivity and could,
therefore, yield a higher payoff for the principal when such shocks
are important [Lazear and Rosen 1981; Green and Stokey 1983;
to piece rate incentives. Similarly, Laffont and Matoussi [1995] find worker
productivity to be 50 percent higher in farms operated under fixed rent contracts
compared with those under sharecropping contracts. Foster and Rosenzweig
[1994] show that effort, proxied by the depletion of body mass net of calorie intake,
is 22 percent higher for rural laborers paid by piece rates compared with those
paid hourly wages.
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Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983]. This literature, however, typically
assumes that workers ignore the externality their effort imposes
on others under relative incentives. The model that follows shows
how, other things equal, a worker’s response depends on whether
she has social preferences. Therefore, the empirical comparison of
productivity under the two schemes can provide evidence on
whether social preferences are relevant in practice.
Consider a group of N workers. Each worker i exerts ei  0
units of effort which determines her productivity. Without loss of
generality, we assume that effort equals productivity in what
follows. Each worker’s payoff is   iei
2/ 2, where  is the
benefit derived from pay (which depends on effort), and iei
2/ 2 is
the cost of effort. We assume that  is a differentiable concave
function, with limx30( x)  . The parameter i is interpreted
as the inverse of the workers innate ability. We assume that
workers are heterogeneous along this dimension, and can be
ordered such that 1  2  . . .  N, where i  0 for all i. The
relationship between effort and pay depends on the incentive
scheme as explained below.
II.A. Relative Incentives
Under relative incentives, a worker’s pay depends on how she
performs relative to her peers. More specifically, in our setting,
workers’ benefit from pay takes the form (ei/e ) for all i, where
e  (1/N) ¥i ei is the average effort of all N workers.
3 The relative
scheme has the key characteristics that other things equal, an
increase in worker i’s effort (i) increases her pay; and (ii) in-
creases average effort and, hence, imposes a negative externality
by reducing the pay of everybody else in the group.
The choice of effort under relative incentives then depends on
whether and to what extent workers internalize this externality,
namely on whether they have social preferences. Denote by 	i the
weight that worker i places on her coworker’s payoffs. The equi-
librium effort for worker i solves
(1) max
ei
eie   	i 
j
i
eje   jej
2
2   iei
2
2 .
3. This relative incentive scheme is not a rank order tournament. Worker
benefits are based on their cardinal and not their ordinal ranking. It is, however,
similar to a “linear relative performance evaluation” (LRPE) scheme as studied in
Knoeber and Thurman [1994]. Under a LRPE worker’s compensation is,  
(ei  e ), where  and  are parameters taken as given by workers.
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Such social preferences can be thought of as a reduced-form
representation of a number of models. They depict behavior con-
sistent with reciprocity or altruism [Fehr and Schmidt 1999], or
the evolutionary equilibrium of a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
game in which workers learn which strategies to play [Levine and
Pesendorfer 2000; Sethi and Somanathan 1999]. In Section VII
we present some evidence to distinguish between models in which
workers’ preferences display altruism toward others, and models
in which workers behave as if they are altruistic because, for
instance, they play trigger strategies to enforce implicit collusive
agreements.
Assuming that worker i chooses her effort taking the effort of
others as given, the Nash equilibrium effort of worker i solves
(2) eie  1e ¥j
i ej(Ne )   	ie 
j
i
eje  ejNe   iei.
II.B. Piece Rates
Under piece rates, individual effort is paid at a fixed rate 
per unit. With social preferences, worker i chooses her effort
under piece rates as follows:
(3) max
ei
ei  	i 
j
i
(ej)  jej22   iei
2
2 .
The equilibrium effort level solves the first-order condition,
(4) ei  iei.
Naturally, as worker i’s effort does not affect the pay of her
coworkers, her optimal choice of effort is independent of the social
weight she places on others.
II.C. Comparing Relative Incentives and Piece Rates
To compare effort choices under the relative scheme and
under piece rates, we evaluate the first-order condition (4) at  
1/e so that for a given average effort level, the pay per unit of
effort is the same under both incentive schemes. The first-order
condition under piece rates then is
(5) eie  1e  iei.
The difference between the first-order conditions (2) and (5)
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can then be ascribed to two sources. The first and most important
difference is the externality worker i imposes on others under
relative incentives. By increasing her effort, she also increases
the average effort, and this reduces the pay of coworkers other
things equal. The magnitude of this effect depends on the extent
to which workers internalize the externality, that is, on the social
weight 	i. This is captured in the second term on the left-hand
side of (2). When 	i  0, worker i’s productivity is lower under
relative incentives compared with that under piece rates. Second,
by exerting more effort, each worker lowers the pay she receives
for each unit of effort under relative incentives. This effect, cap-
tured by the ¥j
i ej/(Ne ) term, also reduces productivity under
relative incentives but is negligible in large groups.4
This highlights that the difference between productivity un-
der relative incentives and piece rates depends on the extent to
which workers have social preferences and so internalize the
externality they impose on others. This difference is minimized
when 	i  0 for all i, namely when workers do not take into
account the effect of their actions on others. In this case, effort
levels under the two schemes are, thus, almost identical for
large N.
In contrast, when 	i  1 for all i, the first-order condition
under relative incentives (2) coincides with the first-order condi-
tion of the social optimum among workers; that is, when effort
levels are chosen to maximize the welfare of the group as a whole.
In the remainder of the paper we establish whether productivity
is indeed different under the two schemes and then derive impli-
cations for the workers’ underlying preferences.
III. CONTEXT AND DATA DESCRIPTION
III.A. Context
We analyze personnel data from a leading United Kingdom-
based fruit farm for the 2002 season. Workers in the sample are
hired seasonally to pick fruit across a number of fields on the
farm. They are paid according to a relative incentive scheme for
4. This is seen most clearly in the case of homogeneous workers. Then the
Nash equilibrium effort level under relative incentives is e*i  e
R  ((1 
1/N)(1))1/ 2 and e*i  e
P  ((1))1/ 2 under piece rates. The ratio of effort under
the two systems is, thus, (1  1/N)1/ 2. If workers are heterogeneous, the ratio
depends on group size and workers’ ability, although it can be shown that
limN3e
R  eP.
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the first half of the season and according to piece rates for the
second half. In both cases workers face a compensation schedule
of the form,
compensation  Ki,
where Ki is the total kilograms of fruit picked by worker i on the
field-day. Throughout we define individual productivity yi as the
number of kilograms of fruit picked per hour.5
Under the relative scheme, the unit wage  is endogenously
determined by the average productivity of all workers in the same
field on the same day. In particular,  is set according to
(6)   w /y ,
where w is the minimum wage plus a positive constant fixed by
the management at the beginning of the season, and y is the
average hourly productivity of all workers on the field-day. At the
start of each field-day, the field manager announces an ex ante
unit wage based on her expectation of worker productivity. This
unit wage is revised at the end of each field-day to ensure that a
worker with productivity y earns the preestablished hourly
wage w .
In line with the relative scheme analyzed in Section II,
worker i’s compensation depends on her productivity relative to
the average productivity of her coworkers. In particular, given
Ki  yih, where h is the number of hours worked in a field,
worker i’s pay is ( yi/y )hw . Note that an increase in worker i’s
effort increases the average productivity on the field-day and,
thus, imposes a negative externality on her coworkers by reduc-
ing the unit wage  in (6).
Under piece rates, the unit wage is set ex ante, based on the
manager’s assessment of productivity that field-day, and is not
revised. The manager aims to set the unit wage at the level such
that the worker with average productivity receives the minimum
wage plus a fixed positive constant. The data under piece rates
indicate that the rate was set correctly in the sense that the unit
5. To comply with minimum wage laws, workers’ compensation is supple-
mented whenever Ki falls below the pro-rata minimum wage. In practice, the
farm management makes clear that any worker who needs to have her compen-
sation increased to the minimum wage level repeatedly would be fired. Indeed, we
observe less than 1 percent of all worker-field-day observations involving pay
increases to meet the minimum wage requirements. Of these, 46 percent occurred
under relative incentives, 54 percent occurred under piece rates.
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wage set ex ante is very close to the unit wage that would obtain
ex post if the relative formula in (6) were used instead.6
The key difference between the two systems is that under the
relative incentives, workers’ effort on the day determines the unit
wage for each kilogram picked on that field-day. Under piece
rates, workers’ effort does not affect the unit wage.7
Workers in the sample are hired on a casual basis, namely
work is offered daily with no guarantee of further employment.
The majority of workers hired are from Eastern and Central
Europe and live together on the farm for the duration of their
stay.8 Workers are issued with a farm-specific work permit for a
maximum of six months, implying that they cannot be legally
employed elsewhere in the United Kingdom. Their outside option
is, therefore, to return to their home countries. The vast majority
of workers in the sample report their main reason to seek tem-
porary employment in the United Kingdom to be financial, which
is hardly surprising in light of the fact that wages are much
higher in the United Kingdom than in their home countries.9
We analyze productivity data on one type of fruit only and
focus on the season’s peak time—between mid-May and the end
of August. Fruit plants are lined up in rows, and each worker is
assigned one or more adjacent rows to pick. The productivity of
each worker depends exclusively on her effort and on the amount
of fruit available on her rows, namely workers’ efforts are not
complements in production.
Data on workers’ productivity are recorded electronically.
6. Hence, under both incentive schemes the unit wage in part depends on the
field life cycle, field conditions, and other determinants of expected productivity.
The unit wage is, therefore, mechanically negatively related to productivity. We
do not observe exogenous changes in the unit wage that allow us to estimate the
wage elasticity of labor supply for example.
7. Workers face more uncertainty over the unit wage under relative incen-
tives because although a rate is announced ex ante, this can be revised ex post to
reflect the productivity of the average worker. Under piece rates, the ex ante unit
wage cannot be revised. However, uncertainty is unlikely to have a large impact
on effort choices because workers play the same game daily and have many
opportunities to learn the ex post adjustment of the unit wage under relative
incentives. In Section IV we further discuss whether uncertainty can explain the
change in productivity we observe in the data.
8. In order to qualify, individuals must be full-time students, and have at
least one year before graduation. Workers must (i) return to the same university
in the autumn, (ii) be able to speak English, (iii) have not worked in the United
Kingdom before, and (iv) be aged between 19 and 25.
9. As of January 2003, gross monthly earnings at the United Kingdom
minimum wage (Euro 1105) are five times as high as at the minimum wage in
Poland (Euro 201), where the majority of workers come from, and almost twenty
times higher than in Bulgaria (Euro 56), the poorest country in our sample.
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Each worker is assigned a unique bar code, which is used to track
the quantity of fruit they pick on each field and day in which they
work. This ensures little or no measurement error in recorded
productivity. The sample is restricted to those workers who
worked at least ten field-days under each incentive scheme. Our
working sample contains 10,215 worker-field-day level observa-
tions, covering 142 workers, 22 fields, and 108 days in total.
The compensation scheme changed from relative incentives
to piece rates for all workers midway through the season. Rela-
tive incentives are in place for the first 54 days in the sample,
piece rates are in place for the remaining 54. The change was
announced on the same day it was first implemented. No other
organizational change took place during the season, as reported
by farm management and as documented in the next subsection.
Finally, interviews with management revealed that the rela-
tive incentive scheme was adopted because it allowed them to
difference out common productivity shocks, such as those derived
from weather and field conditions, that are a key determinant of
productivity in this setting. The management eventually decided
to move to piece rates because productivity had been lower
than they initially expected at the start of the season. Whether
the move to piece rates had the desired effect is analyzed in
Section IV.
III.B. Descriptive Analysis
Table I provides information on unconditional worker pro-
ductivity by incentive scheme. Productivity rose significantly
from an average of 5.01 kg/hr in the first half of the picking
season under relative incentives to 7.98 kg/hr in the second half
of the season under piece rates, an unconditional increase of 59
percent.
Figures I and II show disaggregated productivity data across
time and across workers under the two schemes. Figure I shows
the mean of worker productivity over time in the two fields that
were operated for the most days under each incentive scheme.
Together, these fields contribute one-third of the total worker-
field-day observations. Under relative incentives, there is no dis-
cernible trend in productivity. With the introduction of piece
rates, productivity rose and remained at a higher level until the
end of the season.
Figure II shows kernel density estimates of individual pro-
ductivity by each incentive scheme. The productivity of each of
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the 142 workers in the sample is averaged within each incentive
scheme in this figure. The mean and variance of productivity both
rise moving from relative incentives to piece rates.
The second and third rows of Table I reveal that the increase
TABLE I
UNCONDITIONAL DIFFERENCES IN PRODUCTIVITY AND OTHER VARIABLES
MEAN, STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES, AND CONFIDENCE INTERVAL
IN BRACKETS
Relative incentives Piece rates Difference
Worker productivity (kg/hr) 5.01 7.98
(.243) (.208) 2.97***
[4.53, 5.49] [7.57, 8.39]
Kilos picked per day Confidential 23.2***
Hours worked per day Confidential .475
Number of workers in same field 41.1 38.1 3.11
(2.38) (1.29)
Daily pay Confidential 1.80
Unit wage per kilogram picked Confidential .105***
*** denotes significance at 1 percent. Sample sizes are the same as those used for the productivity
regressions. Standard errors and confidence intervals take account of the observations being clustered by
field-day. Productivity is measured in kilograms per hour. Daily pay refers to pay from picking only. Both
daily pay and the unit wage per kilogram picked are measured in UK Pounds Sterling. Some information in
the table cannot be shown due to confidentiality requirements.
FIGURE I
Productivity (kilogram/hour) over the Season
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in productivity was entirely due to workers picking more fruit
over the same time period, rather than working shorter hours. On
average, workers picked 23.2 more kilograms per day under piece
rates—a significant difference at the 1 percent level. Hours
worked did not significantly change across incentive schemes.
The discussion in Section II makes clear that the size of the
group over which relative pay is computed is key for understand-
ing workers’ behavior under relative incentives. The fourth row of
Table I reports the average number of people each worker worked
with on a given field-day. This remained constant throughout the
season. The fact that under relative incentives, the unit wage
depends on the average productivity of 40 workers has two im-
plications. First, the effect each worker has on her own pay is
negligible, and so if workers do have social preferences there
should be no difference in their productivity under the two incen-
tive schemes. Second, by exerting effort, the worker reduces the
pay of many coworkers under relative incentives. Hence, if work-
ers behave as if they have social preferences, there may be a large
divergence in their productivity between when they are paid
according to a relative incentive scheme and piece rates.
The analysis of aggregate farm level data reveals that the
change in incentive scheme did not coincide with a wave of new
arrivals, nor did it hasten the departure of workers. Indeed, very
FIGURE II
Distribution of Productivity (kg/hr) by Incentive Scheme
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few workers left before or just after the change in incentive
schemes.10
Second, we find that the total kilograms picked per day
shows no discernible trend under either incentive scheme, a con-
sequence of the deliberate timing of planting of fields to ensure a
constant stream of fruit throughout the season. Third, the total
man-hours spent picking are higher under relative incentives.
This is due entirely to more workers picking, rather than each
worker picking for longer hours. Under piece rates the total
man-hours spent picking falls as fewer workers are required to
pick each day.
Overall, while total kilograms picked and the time spent
picking per field-day remained constant throughout the sea-
son, the total number of workers allocated to picking fell mov-
ing from relative incentives to piece rates. Under piece rates,
the management had some workers pick less frequently and
instead had them perform other tasks, mostly related to the
transportation and packaging of fruit. These workers had the
same productivity as workers who continued regularly on pick-
ing tasks. They also did not differ on characteristics such as
gender and nationality.
Figure IIIa shows the wage paid per kilogram over time—the
unit wage , in percentage deviation from its mean.11 Under
relative incentives the unit wage rises gradually as productivity
declines. This is as expected given that under the relative incen-
tive scheme, the unit wage is set endogenously according to (6).
With the introduction of piece rates there is a one-off fall in
the unit wage. Table I shows that the difference in average unit
wages between the two halves of the season is significant at the 1
percent level. It is, therefore, unlikely that the observed rise in
productivity is a consequence of higher returns to the marginal
unit of effort under piece rates. To the contrary, the pay per unit
of effort is lower under piece rates.
Figure IIIb then shows the daily pay from picking over the
season, as a percentage deviation from its mean. Given that
productivity and unit wages are inversely related to each other,
average workers’ pay remained relatively constant over time.
Table I shows that the difference in average daily pay between
10. This and other results not reported here are available in a companion
working paper [Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul 2004].
11. Due to confidentiality requirements we cannot show this series in levels.
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relative incentives and piece rate is positive but not significantly
different from zero. Overall, the average worker became worse off
under piece rates: their productivity rose, while total compensa-
FIGURE IIIb
Daily Pay over the Season
Sample sizes are the same as those used for the productivity regressions. The
series for the daily wage is an average over all fields operated on each day. This
average is weighted by the number of man-hours on each field-day. The series for
daily pay is averaged over all workers each day. This average is weighted by the
hours worked per worker on each day.
FIGURE IIIa
Unit Wage over the Season
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tion did not increase significantly. The regression estimates in
the next section, therefore, most likely provide a lower bound of
the effect of the change in incentives on productivity holding
utility constant.12 However, the top third of workers did have
significant increases in pay moving to piece rates (not reported),
which is as expected if workers are of heterogeneous ability.
The empirical analysis proceeds in four stages. Section IV
presents reduced-form evidence on whether the change in incen-
tive schemes causes the increase in productivity. Section V pre-
sents structural-form estimates on workers’ social preferences
that are consistent with the observed change in productivity.
Section VI provides reduced-form evidence on how the relation-
ship among coworkers affects individual productivity under the
two incentive schemes. Section VII provides evidence to distin-
guish between pure altruism and collusion as motives behind
workers’ behavior.
IV. REDUCED-FORM EVIDENCE OF THE RESPONSE TO INCENTIVES
IV.A. Empirical Method
We first identify the effect of the change in incentives on
individual worker productivity. We estimate the productivity of
worker i on field f on day t, yift, using the following panel data
regression, where all continuous variables are in logarithms:
(7) yift  i  f  Pt  Xift  Zft  t  uift.
Worker fixed effects i capture time-invariant, worker-level de-
terminants of productivity such as innate ability and intrinsic
motivation. Field fixed effects f capture time-invariant, field-
level determinants of productivity such as soil quality and plant
spacing. Pt is a dummy equal to one when piece rates are in place
and zero when relative incentives are in place. The parameter of
interest throughout is , namely the effect of the move from
relative incentives to piece rates on individual productivity.
As piece rates are introduced simultaneously across all fields,
it is not possible to control for day fixed effects. Instead, we
12. We maintain the standard assumption in the incentives literature that
the utility-maximizing level of effort is increasing in the piece rate. We discuss
whether income effects or income targeting can explain the observed increase in
productivity in Section IV.
932 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
control for time-varying factors at both the individual (Xift) and
field (Zft) level and for a farm level trend t.
The disturbance term uift captures unobservable determi-
nants of productivity at the worker-field-day level. Worker obser-
vations within the same field-day are unlikely to be independent
since workers face similar field conditions. We account for this by
clustering standard errors at the field-day level in all productivity
regressions.13
IV.B. Baseline Results
Table II presents the baseline estimates of the effect of the
change in incentive scheme on worker productivity. Column (1)
regresses worker productivity on a dummy for the introduction of
piece rates, clustering standard errors by field-day. Productivity
rises significantly by 70 percent when moving from relative in-
centives to piece rates.
Column (2) controls for worker fixed effects, so that only
variation within a worker over time is exploited, while column (3)
additionally controls for field fixed effects, so only variation
within a worker picking on the same field over time is exploited.
Controlling for worker heterogeneity improves the fit of the model
considerably—worker fixed effects almost double the explained
variation in productivity. In contrast, field heterogeneity appears
to be much less important. The estimated effect of the change in
incentives on individual productivity remains significant and of
similar magnitude as in column (1).
Column (4) controls for other time-varying determinants of
productivity at the level of the farm, field, and individual. We
include a linear time trend to capture farm level changes over
time, a measure of each field’s life cycle to capture field level
changes over time and a measure of each worker’s picking expe-
rience. We measure the field’s life cycle as the number of calendar
days the field has been picked at any moment in time, divided by
the total number of days the field is picked over the season. Each
field is picked for a predetermined number of days that depends
on the number and the age of the plants, which were planted
earlier in the season or in the previous years. The field’s life cycle
13. We also allowed observations to be clustered at the work level and at the
worker-incentive scheme level to account for idiosyncratic worker characteristics
that lead to worker productivity over different field-days being correlated. Doing
so caused the estimated standard errors to fall considerably.
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variable, thus, captures the natural trend in productivity that
occurs within each field as it depletes over time.
Picking experience is defined as the number of field-days the
worker has picked for. To identify the effect of the field’s life cycle
and the worker’s picking experience from the general farm trend,
we use the variation arising from the fact that different fields
start being picked at different points in time, that fields are not
picked every day, and that different workers arrive on different
dates.
We find that there is no trend in productivity over time at the
level of the farm. This is consistent with the fact that different
fields are operated at different times to ensure a constant stream
of output throughout the season. Within each field, however,
productivity declines as the field is picked later in its cycle.
TABLE II
THE EFFECT OF THE CHANGE IN INCENTIVES ON INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTIVITY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE  LOG OF WORKER’S PRODUCTIVITY
(KILOGRAM PICKED PER HOUR PER FIELD-DAY)
ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS REPORTED IN PARENTHESES, ALLOWING FOR CLUSTERING
AT FIELD-DAY LEVEL
(1)
Unconditional
(2) Worker
heterogeneity
(3) Field
heterogeneity
(4)
Controls
Piece rate dummy
(Pt) .530*** .515*** .460*** .577***
(.059) (.056) (.070) (.098)
Time trend .004
(.003)
Field life cycle 1.16***
(.362)
Worker experience .077***
(.031)
Worker fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Field fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 .1607 .2925 .3407 .3640
Number of
observations
(worker-field-day) 10215 10215 10215 10215
*** denotes significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. Standard errors are clustered
at the field-day level. All continuous variables are in logs. The piece rate dummy is set equal to zero when
relative incentives are in place, and set equal to one when piece rates are in place. The sample is restricted
to workers who have worked at least ten days under both incentive schemes. The field life cycle is defined as
the number of days the field has been operated at any moment in time, divided by the total number of days
the field is operated over the season. Worker experience is defined as the number of field-days the worker has
picked for. There are 142 workers, 22 fields, and 108 days in the sample.
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Moreover, there are positive returns to picking experience as
expected.14
The results confirm the quantitative importance of the
change in incentives on productivity. A one standard deviation
increase in the field life cycle reduces productivity by 20 percent,
while a one standard deviation increase in picking experience
increases productivity by 7 percent. In comparison, the move from
relative incentives to piece rates significantly increases produc-
tivity by 78 percent.
Further analysis, not reported for reasons of space, shows
that this result is robust to controlling for other time-varying
factors including contemporaneous and lagged weather condi-
tions, field supervisor fixed effects, and the ratio of supervisors to
workers.15
IV.C. Robustness Checks
As the change in incentives occurs at the same time in all
fields, identification of the effect of this change on productivity
arises from a comparison over time of the same worker. The
estimated effect ̂ is then biased upward to the extent that it
captures factors that cause productivity to rise through the sea-
son regardless of the change in incentive schemes and that are
not captured by the farm level trend or the field-specific life cycle.
Table III presents a series of robustness checks to precisely
address this concern. First, we augment the sample by adding
worker-field-day observations from the same farm in 2004 when
workers were paid piece rates throughout. We restrict the sample
to workers who picked at least ten days before and after July 8.
The 2004 sample, thus, consists of 55 workers, 18 fields, and 3664
worker-field-day observations. We estimate the productivity of
worker i on field f on day t, yift, using the following panel data
regression:
14. To check robustness to functional form specifications, we also ran the
regression in log-linear form (i.e., log productivity on the levels of picking expe-
rience, field cycle, and trend) and in log-quadratic form (i.e., log productivity on
the levels and the squares of picking experience, field cycle, and trend). Finally, we
also allowed for field-specific trends. The estimated effect of the introduction of
piece rates is robust to these alternative specifications. These results are not
reported for reasons of space and are available from the authors on request.
15. Each supervisor is assigned a group of 15 to 30 workers. The supervisor
is primarily responsible for ensuring that fruit is taken from the field for pack-
aging and preventing bottlenecks in production. Supervisors are paid a fixed wage
throughout the season.
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(8) yift  i  f  
s1
2
s Ptdt
s  
s1
2
s Xiftdt
s
 
s1
2
s Zftdt
s  
s1
2
stdt
s  uift,
where s  {1,2} identifies the season and dt
1  1 for the 2002
season and 0 otherwise, while dt
2  1 for the 2004 season and 0
TABLE III
THE EFFECT OF THE CHANGE IN INCENTIVES ON INDIVIDUAL
PRODUCTIVITY-ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE  LOG OF WORKER’S PRODUCTIVITY
(KILOGRAM PICKED PER HOUR PER FIELD-DAY)
ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS REPORTED IN PARENTHESES, ALLOWING FOR CLUSTERING
AT FIELD-DAY LEVEL
(1) Difference
in difference
with 2004
season
(2)
Placebo
piece rate:
fields
(3)
Placebo
piece rate:
workers
(4) Twenty
days
Piece rate dummy
(2002)
.577*** .387***
(.098) (.110)
Placebo piece rate
dummy (2004)
.096
(.086)
Placebo piece rate based
on field life cycle
.156
(.196)
Placebo piece rate based
on number of days
present on the farm
.009
(0.91)
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Field fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes No
Adjusted R2 .4149 .4927 .5921 .2922
Number of observations
(worker-field-day)
13879 2863 879 2969
*** denotes significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. Standard errors are clustered
at the field-day level. All continuous variables are in logs. The piece rate dummy is set equal to zero when
relative incentives are in place, and set equal to one when piece rates are in place. Other controls include
worker picking experience, field life cycle, and a linear time trend. The sample in column (1) covers workers
who have worked at least ten days under both incentive schemes in 2002 and workers who have worked at
least ten days either side of July 8 in 2004. Control variables are year specific. The sample in column (2)
covers workers who have worked at least ten days under both incentive schemes and fields that have been
operated exclusively under one incentive scheme. The sample in column (3) covers workers who have arrived
at the farm after the introduction of piece rates. The sample in column (4) is restricted to the last ten days
under relative incentives and the first ten days under piece rates.
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otherwise. We define a placebo piece rate dummy Pt for the 2004
season to be equal to one after July 8; that is, when piece rates
were introduced in 2002. Thus, 1 measures the effect of the
introduction of piece rates in 2002 on individual productivity and
2 measures the effect of the placebo piece rate in 2004. As in the
previous specification we include workers’ fixed effects i, fields
fixed effects f, workers’ experience Xift, the field life cycle Zft,
and a farm level trend, allowing these variables to be different in
the two seasons.16
The difference-in-difference estimates in column (1) indicate
that the previous result was not due to seasonality: the placebo
dummy for piece rates for the 2004 season has no effect on
productivity. Interestingly, we also find that the estimated coef-
ficients of the farm level variables (trend and field life cycle) are
the same in the two seasons. In contrast, returns to experience
are twice as large in 2004, in line with workers holding back effort
under relative incentives in 2002.
The second and third tests simulate the introduction of piece
rates in fields and for workers that did not actually experience the
change in incentive schemes in 2002.
For fields, we note that the two main fields operated most
frequently under both incentive schemes, experienced the change
in incentive scheme at one-quarter of their life cycle. We construct
a placebo piece rate dummy for each field, set equal to one after a
field has passed 25 percent of its life cycle and zero otherwise. We
then examine whether this placebo dummy affects the productiv-
ity of the sample of fields that are only operated under either
relative incentives or piece rates. The result in column (2) shows
no evidence of a natural jump in productivity on fields after they
pass 25 percent of their life cycle.
Column (3) exploits the same idea at the worker level. In the
baseline sample, workers had been picking for an average of
nineteen days before the change in incentives. For the placebo
test we exploit information on workers who arrived after the
introduction of piece rates. We create a placebo piece rate dummy
for each such worker set equal to one after that worker has been
picking for nineteen days. The result in column (3) shows no
16. While some of the fields observed in 2004 are the same as those in 2002,
we allow the fixed effect to be different to capture the fact that the plants are at
a different stage of their life in the two years. None of the workers is present in
both seasons.
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evidence of the natural jump in worker productivity at this level
of picking experience.
Finally, in column (4) we restrict the time window to ten days
before and after the introduction of piece rates to eliminate the
effect of natural long-term changes in productivity. This specifi-
cation yields our lowest estimate of ̂. The effect is nevertheless
large: for the average worker, productivity was 47 percent higher
during the ten days after the introduction of piece rates compared
with that during the last ten days under relative incentives.17
Further analysis indicates that results are robust to the
possible selection of different workers into picking over time, and
to controlling for changes in task composition in the two halves of
the season. We also find that the introduction of piece rates was
not anticipated in the sense that productivity did not significantly
change in the week prior to the introduction of piece rates, that
workers reacted slowly to the change (possibly in the hope of
reinstating the relative incentive scheme), and that the quanti-
tative effect of the move to piece rates on productivity lasted
throughout the season.18
A remaining issue is whether the increase in productivity
came at the expense of the quality of fruit picked. Pickers are
expected to classify fruit as either class 1—suitable as supermar-
ket produce, or class 2—suitable as market produce. This is
especially pertinent in this context because, due to technological
restrictions, misclassifications of fruit cannot be traced back to
individual workers. To check for this, we analyze whether the
misclassification of fruit worsened after the introduction of piece
rates. Results, reported in Appendix 2 show that this was not the
case.
IV.D. Income Targeting and Other Hypotheses
Taken together, the results show that moving from a relative
incentive scheme to piece rates significantly increased worker
productivity by at least 50 percent. As workers’ pay remained
constant on average under both incentive schemes while produc-
tivity increased, this estimated increase in productivity is most
likely a lower bound on the pure effect of the change in incentives,
holding worker utility constant.
17. Given the shorter time frame, we do not include other time-varying
controls in this specification.
18. These robustness checks are discussed in detail in Bandiera, Barankay,
and Rasul [2004].
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We now discuss alternative explanations for the change in
workers’ behavior from relative incentives to piece rates. While
the negative externality is the most evident source of difference
between the two schemes, workers’ behavior might possibly re-
flect income targeting, their reaction to uncertainty, and ratchet
concerns. We address these below.
First, as discussed in Section III, the unit wage per kilogram
decreased by 12 percent moving from relative incentives to piece
rates. If workers adjust their effort to reach a constant daily
income target, the fall in the unit wage may cause the observed
increase in productivity. To judge the empirical relevance of in-
come targeting in our context, it is important to stress that
workers cannot choose the number of hours they work, implying
that the standard income-leisure trade-off does not arise. In other
words, workers can adjust only on the intensive margin, for
instance by choosing to work harder when the unit wage is low, to
achieve their income target.19
Three pieces of evidence cast doubt on the empirical rele-
vance of income targeting in this setting. First, we find that
workers who face higher piece rates work harder. To establish
this, we exploit the fact that the real value of piece rates varies
exogenously among workers who come from countries with dif-
ferent levels of GDP per capita, and that workers save most of
their earnings to bring back to their home countries. Although all
workers come from Eastern Europe, there are large cross-country
differences. For instance, gross monthly earnings at the mini-
mum wage are four times higher in Poland (euro 210) compared
with Bulgaria (euro 56). In line with the assumption that more
high powered incentives result in higher effort, we find workers
who come from poorer countries have higher productivity, all else
equal. To the extent that the worker pools from different coun-
tries are not selected differently, the cross-sectional evidence does
not lend support to the income targeting hypothesis.
Second, we find that workers’ daily pay responds to exoge-
nous variation in weather conditions. In particular, workers earn
more when the temperature is milder. This is in contrast to the
19. Other analyses of income targeting in different settings reach mixed
conclusions. Oettinger [1999] finds that exogenous wage increases have a strong
and positive effect on the labor supply of stadium vendors, which is not consistent
with daily income targeting. Camerer et al. [1997] find that New York cabdrivers
work fewer hours when the observed daily wage is higher and interpret this as
evidence in favor of income targeting. In contrast, Farber [2004] using similar
data, presents evidence against such income targeting by cabdrivers.
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hypothesis that workers adjust their effort levels to achieve the
same absolute daily income target.
Finally, as we show in Section VI, productivity under relative
incentives depends on the social relationships between workers in
the field and on the number of workers in the field, while neither
of these two factors affect productivity under piece rates. These
findings cast doubt on the hypothesis that income targeting is
fully responsible for the difference in productivity under the two
incentive schemes, as income targeting does not predict that
social connections and group size should have a different effect
under the two schemes (if at all).20
Another difference between the relative scheme and piece
rates is that under the latter, the unit wage is set ex ante at the
beginning of the field-day, whereas under the former the unit
wage is determined endogenously at the end of the field-day,
based on workers’ productivity. Workers may then work less hard
under relative incentives because of uncertainty over the ex post
unit wage.
Such uncertainty may play a role in the first days a worker
picks, but is unlikely to be driving the difference in productivity
given that workers form expectations on the unit wage based on
repeated observations each field-day they pick. Simulation re-
sults further show that uncertainty can only explain the observed
change in productivity if workers’ expectations of the variance are
orders of magnitude larger than is observed in the data.
Finally, relative incentives and piece rates also differ because
under piece rates workers may underperform if they believe that
working hard will result in management setting lower piece rates
in the future. In such a dynamic framework, productivity under
piece rates is lower than implied by (4). This ratchet effect does
not occur under relative incentives because the unit wage is based
exclusively on the average productivity on a given field-day.
Hence, in the presence of such ratchet effects, the true effect of
the change in incentives on productivity is underestimated.
There are a number of reasons why in this setting, there are
unlikely to be such large ratchet effects. First, given the stochas-
tic nature of agricultural production, it is difficult for workers to
disentangle changes in the piece rate due to changing conditions
and those due to management learning about workers’ true abil-
20. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this point.
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ity.21 Second, the effect of a worker’s current performance on the
unit wage she faces in the future is weak as the unit wage is
field-day specific and workers are reallocated to different fields on
different days.22 Finally, any ratchet effect should become weaker
as the time horizon of the worker becomes shorter. We checked for
this and did not find worker’s productivity to change significantly
in their last week of work.
V. STRUCTURAL-FORM EVIDENCE ON WORKERS PREFERENCES
V.A. Empirical Method
We now use the data on worker productivity to draw impli-
cations for workers’ behavior in light of the models discussed in
Section II. Our first aim is to assess whether the observed change
in productivity is consistent with the standard assumption that
workers ignore the externality they impose on others under the
relative scheme (	i  0), or whether they fully internalize it
(	i  1).
To this purpose, we use the first-order conditions of the
workers’ maximization problem derived in Section II to compute
an estimate of each worker’s cost parameter, i, under each
incentive scheme and behavioral assumption. Since the workers’
cost (ability) parameters are innate, we ought to find the same
implied distributions of costs across workers under both incentive
schemes if the underlying behavioral assumption is correct.
Workers are paid on the basis of their observed productivity
y which is a function of their effort e. Taking this into account, the
first-order conditions for the choice of effort under relative incen-
tives assuming that workers do not internalize the externality
(	i  0), assuming that they do fully (	i  1), and under piece
rates are respectively,
(9) yiy   yiei  ¥j
i yj(¥i yi)2  1N iei,
21. Such ratchet concerns have been documented to exist in workplaces
where productivity shocks are less common such as shoe making [Freeman and
Kleiner 1998] and bricklaying [Roy 1952].
22. In particular, workers face uncertainty over which fields they will be
assigned to in the future—the probability a worker works on the same field on two
consecutive days is .25. Workers are also uncertain about the identity of their
future coworkers.
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(10)
 yi
ei
1
¥i yi2 yiy  j
i yj  j
i yjy yj  1N iei,
(11) yi
yi
ei
 iei.
To derive estimates of i in each case, we proceed as follows. First,
we assume that the benefit function is of the following CRRA
type,
(12)  y  y1/ for   1.
Throughout we report results obtained with   2. The results
are, however, robust to alternative choices of . Second, we derive
an estimate of worker effort, ei, assuming a Cobb-Douglas rela-
tionship between effort and productivity, as explained below.23
Third, we substitute data (on each field-day) for estimated
effort, observed productivity ( yi), unit wages () and group size
(N), into the first-order conditions above. We then obtain an
estimate of i on each field-day the worker picks, ̂ift, and take the
median of these to derive a unique estimate of i, under each
incentive scheme and behavioral assumption.24
We, therefore, derive three estimates of i based on the
calibration of the first-order conditions (9), (10), and (11), respec-
tively, (i) under relative incentives assuming that workers do not
internalize the externality, ̂i
RN; (ii) under relative incentives
assuming workers fully internalize the externality, namely that
they choose efforts cooperatively, ̂i
RC; and (iii) under piece
rates, ̂i
P.
Finally, we compare the distribution of ̂i
P with the distribu-
tions of ̂i
RN and ̂i
RC to assess whether either of these two as-
sumptions on the underlying behavior of workers is consistent
with the observed change in productivity.
We assume that workers’ effort e translates into productivity
y through a Cobb-Douglas production function. To estimate
23. This implies that the same effort on two different days can lead to two
different levels of productivity depending on other inputs into production, such as
field conditions. In the first-order conditions (9) to (11),  yi/ei  yi/ei with a
Cobb-Douglas specification, so that i is identified up to some scalar in each case.
This does not affect the comparison of the estimated i’s across the first-order
conditions.
24. The model is overidentified as sample workers work at least ten field-days
under each incentive scheme. We use ̂i  median (̂ift) as this is less sensitive to
outliers. The results are robust to taking the mean of the ̂ift’s or to estimating
them for each worker using maximum likelihood.
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worker effort, we first estimate the productivity regression as in
(7) controlling for the same determinants of productivity as in the
baseline specification of column (4) in Table II, and interacting
each worker fixed effect with the piece rate dummy. The estimate
of worker i’s effort in field f on day t under incentive scheme s 
{R,P} is each worker’s estimated fixed effect added to the residual
from the regression (7) when incentive scheme s is in place:
(13) êift
s  ̂i
s  ûift
s .
The first term captures the worker’s average effort over time
under incentive scheme s. The second term captures how much of
the worker’s productivity cannot be explained by observables.
This method provides an estimate of each worker’s effort (mea-
sured in kilograms per hour) on every field-day on which they
pick.
Consistent with the actual distribution of productivity by
incentive scheme in Figure II, the mean and variance of effort
both rise significantly moving from relative incentives to piece
rates.25 Moreover, we find that nearly all workers put in more
effort under piece rates than under relative incentives and that
there is little churning among workers—those that exert the most
effort under relative incentives continue to exert the most effort
under piece rates and vice versa.
V.B. Individualistic versus Fully Cooperative Behavior
Figure IVa shows the kernel density estimate of the implied
distribution of workers’ cost of effort ̂i
P and ̂i
RN, namely under
the assumption that workers ignore the externality they impose
on others under the relative scheme (	i  0). This shows that the
distribution of cost parameters under relative incentives lies al-
most entirely to the right of the distribution under piece rates,
indicating that the implied cost of effort is higher under relative
incentives than under piece rates.
Assuming that cost of effort is an innate parameter, the fact
that the same distribution of costs cannot be fitted to both incen-
tive schemes indicates that effort choices are not consistent with
25. Splitting the estimated effort (13) into each of its components—the resid-
ual ûift
s , and the worker fixed effect ̂i
s—we find that the exponent of the residuals
is centered around zero under each scheme, but the variance of the residuals
under relative incentives is significantly higher. Hence, it is the distribution of
worker fixed effects, and not the residuals, that drives the differences in the
distributions of effort. See Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul [2004] for details.
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FIGURE IVa
Kernel Density Estimates of Cost of Effort Parameter, by Incentive Scheme
Assuming Individualistic Behavior
FIGURE IVb
Kernel Density Estimates of Cost of Effort Parameter, by Incentive Scheme
Assuming Cooperative Behavior
Kernel density estimates are calculated using an Epanechnikov kernel. The
underlying benefit function is assumed to be
 x  2x1/ 2.
The total cost of effort is assumed to be quadratic in effort. Under individualistic
behavior we imply that the worker chooses her effort to maximize her own net
benefits. Under cooperative behavior we imply the worker chooses her effort level
to maximize the sum of all workers utilities.
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workers ignoring the externality they impose on others under
relative incentives.
Next, we estimate the distribution of workers’ cost of effort ̂i
P
and ̂i
RC, namely under the assumptions that workers fully inter-
nalize the externality their effort imposes on their coworkers
under the relative incentive scheme. Figure IVb shows the im-
plied distributions of the cost parameter i, by incentive scheme.
The distribution of ̂i
P under piece rates is, by definition, un-
changed to that derived above. However, the distribution of costs
under relative incentives ̂i
RC now lies almost entirely to the left
of the distribution under piece rates.
If workers chose their effort levels cooperatively, then the
cost of effort under relative incentives would have to be signifi-
cantly lower under relative incentives to fit the observed produc-
tivity data. In other words, productivity is actually too high under
relative incentives to be explained by workers choosing their
effort levels cooperatively.
Figures IVa and IVb together reveal an interesting pattern.
The observed change in productivity is too large to be reconciled
with the assumption of individualistic behavior but too small to
be reconciled with the assumption of fully cooperative behavior.
This suggests that workers behave as if they internalize the
negative externality to some extent. The next subsection explores
this idea.
V.C. Social Preferences
We now posit that workers have social preferences, namely
that they place some weight on the payoffs of their coworkers
because of either pure altruism or collusion, and retrieve the
reduced-form “social weights” (	i) that fit the observed change in
productivity.
To do so, we assume the true cost of effort of each worker is
that derived under piece rates ̂i
P.26 Given ̂i
P, we calibrate the
first-order condition of the worker’s maximization problem when
they have social preferences, (2),
(14)
 yi
ei
1
¥i yi2 yiy  j
i yj  	i j
i yjy yj  1N ̂iPei.
26. Using this measure of ability, we find that groups were equally hetero-
geneous, in terms of ability, before and after the change in incentives. Hence,
there is no evidence of management sorting workers differently into fields by
ability across the incentive schemes.
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This provides an estimate of each worker’s social weight on every
field-day they pick, 	̂ift. As the model is overidentified, we take
the median of these to derive 	̂i.
The resulting distribution of social weights that explains the
observed change in productivity is shown in Figure V. The aver-
age worker places a social weight of .65 on the benefits of all
others in the same field-day. Less than 3 percent of workers have
an implied social weight greater than one, and less than 2 percent
of workers have an implied social weight of less than zero.
The next section pursues the idea that social preferences
explain why productivity is so much lower under relative incen-
tives. In particular, we explore whether the identity of coworkers
on the field-day has differential effects on workers’ behavior un-
der relative incentives—when worker’s effort imposes a negative
externality on others, and under piece rates—when there are no
externalities imposed on coworkers.
VI. INCENTIVES, SOCIAL NETWORKS, AND WORKERS PRODUCTIVITY
A natural candidate to explain the extent to which workers
place weight on the payoffs of their coworkers is the relationship
among workers on any given field-day. Naturally, the extent to
which a given worker is altruistic or able to collude might depend
on the social relations between her and her coworkers on a given
day. To measure this social relation, we exploit data on each
worker’s self-reported friends on the farm. This information al-
FIGURE V
Kernel Density Estimates of Social Weight (	)
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lows us to explore the hypothesis that workers internalize the
externality more and, hence, are less productive when the exter-
nality hurts their friends rather than other workers.27 To this
purpose, we exploit the variation in the number of friends each
worker works with on each field-day. We identify the effect of
group composition on productivity by comparing the productivity
of the same worker, on the same field, working alongside different
coworkers on different days.
To obtain information on the workers’ social networks on the
farm, we administered a questionnaire about two weeks after the
change in incentive schemes. Workers were asked to name up to
five other workers they were friends with before coming to the
farm and up to five other workers they became friends with
during their stay. In the main analysis below we pool these two
categories.
All but seventeen workers report having at least one friend
on the farm. Conditional on having at least one friend on the
field-day, the share of coworkers who are friends of worker i is on
average 4 percent under both schemes. The dispersion is also very
similar under the two schemes indicating that the results under
piece rates are not due to lack of variation in the share of cowork-
ers who are friends.28
To be clear, the composition of the group varies each field-day.
However, workers themselves do not choose which field they work in
and with whom they work. Rather, group composition is decided by
management taking account of the demand for workers to perform
nonpicking tasks, and how close workers live relative to the fields
that need to be picked. The way in which workers are allocated to
fields then leads to no systematic relation between individual shocks
to productivity and group composition.29
27. Levine and Pesendorfer [2002] show that in an evolutionary equilibrium
of a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which workers learn which strategies
to play, players behave as if they have social preferences. Moreover, the weight
each player places on the benefits of another player depends on the relation
between players. They argue that, “individuals will behave more altruistically
when they can identify with the beneficiary of their altruism.”
28. The mean share of workers who are friends of i is .043 under relative
incentives and .037 under piece rates. Standard deviations are .042 and .034. The
mean share is slightly lower under piece rates because new workers arrive at the
farm. All but 36 workers report having at least one “old” friend on the farm.
Conditional on having at least one old friend, the mean (standard deviation) share
of workers who are old friends of i is .032 (.028) under relative incentives and .023
(.024) under piece rates.
29. Unsurprisingly, workers are more likely to work alongside those they live
with than other randomly chosen individuals. The probability that a worker works
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Table IV reports estimates of the productivity regression (7)
under relative incentives, where we now additionally control for
group composition at the field-day level as well as the baseline
determinants of worker productivity in column (4) of Table II.
Column (1a) controls for the share of coworkers in the same
field who are friends of worker i. Having more friends present
significantly reduces productivity under relative incentives. The
estimated coefficient implies that if worker i moved from a group
with someone she lives with is .605, with a self-reported friend, .549, and with
neither someone she lives with nor a friend, .344. These probabilities do not,
however, change significantly over the two incentive schemes.
TABLE IV
THE EFFECT OF GROUP COMPOSITION ON PRODUCTIVITY BY INCENTIVE SCHEME
DEPENDENT VARIABLE  LOG OF WORKER’S PRODUCTIVITY
(KILOGRAM PICKED PER HOUR PER FIELD-DAY)
ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS REPORTED IN PARENTHESES, ALLOWING FOR CLUSTERING
AT FIELD-DAY LEVEL
(1a)
Relative
incentives
(1b)
Relative
incentives
(2a)
Piece
rates
(2b)
Piece
rates
Share of workers in the field
who are friends
1.68*** 5.52** .072 1.17
(.647) (2.36) (.493) (1.60)
Share of workers in the field
who are friends  number
of workers in same field
1.60** .285
(.684) (.501)
Number of workers in same
field
.182 .085
(.117) (.069)
Marginal effect of group size
(at mean friends’ share)
.236** .076
(.110) (.065)
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Field fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 .3470 .3620 .3065 .3081
Number of observations
(worker-field-day)
2860 2860 4400 4400
*** denotes significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. Robust standard errors are
calculated throughout, allowing for clustering at the field-day level. All continuous variables are in logs. The
sample is restricted to workers who have worked at least ten field-days under both incentive schemes. “Share
of workers who are friends” is equal to the number of self-reported friends present on the field divided by the
total number of workers on the field. Other controls include worker experience, field life cycle, and a linear
time trend.
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with none of her friends to a group where five of her friends are
present, her productivity would fall by 21 percent.
In column (1b) we interact the share of workers in the same
field who are friends of worker i, with the total number of workers
on the field. We find that (i) having more friends present signifi-
cantly reduces productivity under relative incentives, and (ii) this
effect is smaller the greater the number of workers in the same
field. The latter effect is as expected given that the externality
imposed by i on her friends is smaller when the overall group size
is larger.
Column (1b) also shows that the marginal effect of group size
is positive and significant, indicating that workers internalize the
externality less when they work in larger groups, all else equal.
The result is consistent with the intuition that larger groups may
find it harder to coordinate on the low effort equilibrium.30
The results in columns (1a) and (1b) have some obvious
alternative interpretations: when workers work alongside their
friends, they might exert less effort and become less productive
because they talk and socialize with their friends. Or, alterna-
tively, they might choose to work with their friends when they
feel less prone to work hard.
To shed light on these hypotheses, we analyze whether hav-
ing friends around affects productivity under piece rates. Intui-
tively, any relationship between the identity of coworkers and
productivity that is unrelated to the incentive scheme in place,
such as socializing with friends, will be present under both in-
centive schemes. However, if the relationship between the iden-
tity of coworkers and productivity is related to the externality, it
should affect productivity only under relative incentives. The
results in columns (2a) and (2b) lend support to the latter inter-
pretation since the share of coworkers who are friends of i has no
effect on productivity under piece rates.
In short, the evidence indicates that under relative incen-
tives workers internalize the externality more when they work
alongside their friends. The fact that workers’ productivity is not
affected by the presence of friends under piece rates, indicates
30. Section II does not model coordination costs and, therefore, does not
capture this aspect. In the model, the effect of an increase in N on workers’
behavior is negligible. Indeed, on the one hand, each worker’s effect on the mean
is smaller when the group is larger. On the other hand, each worker affects more
people when the group is larger.
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that group composition affects productivity only when workers’
effort imposes a negative externality on coworkers.31
One remaining concern is that friendships may be endoge-
nous outcomes of workers behaving cooperatively with each
other. To check for this, we use an alternative measure of social
networks based only on the friendships that were formed before
workers came to the farm and that are, therefore, uncorrelated
with any events that took place on the farm itself. Reassuringly,
the results in Table IV are unchanged if we use this alternative
definition of friends.32
VII. EXPLAINING WORKER BEHAVIOR
The evidence presented so far is consistent with both a model
of altruism where workers care directly about the utility of others
or with a model of collusion where workers agree to cooperate for
mutual benefit. Discriminating between these hypotheses is im-
portant. The implications for designing a work environment that
facilitates cooperation between coworkers will be different de-
pending on the underlying motive for cooperative behavior. We
now present evidence to distinguish between the hypotheses of
pure altruism and collusion.
Both hypotheses imply that worker i behaves as if in reduced
form she has social preferences as specified in (1). However,
workers are altruistic if the payoff of one or more coworkers
enters their utility directly so that the structural- and reduced-
form representation of preferences coincide. In contrast, self-
interested workers would reduce effort under relative incentives
if, as a group, they are able to enforce implicit collusive agree-
ments through transfers and punishments. In our context, such
collusive behavior might occur despite the finite time horizon
because workers are uncertain over when they, and their cowork-
31. Any factor unrelated to incentives but causing individuals to treat friends
differently over time will be spuriously attributed to the change in incentive
scheme. To check this, we examine whether under piece rates, the effect of having
more friends on the field is different for those who arrived later and so only worked
under piece rates, compared with those who were also present under the relative
incentive scheme. The results, not reported for reasons of space, show that
workers do not react differently to friends when they first arrive.
32. As an additional check we also exploit the fact that workers who arrive on
the same date from the same country are very likely to become friends. The
identifying assumption is that date of arrival is orthogonal to any event that took
place on the farm and could have affected the formation of friendship links.
Results are unchanged if we define the group of friends to include only the people
who arrived within the same three-day window.
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ers, will leave the farm. Workers are also uncertain whether they
will keep on picking or will be allocated to different farm tasks in
the future.
The economic environment we study has a number of fea-
tures that facilitate both collusion and altruism. For example,
workers live and work together, interacting repeatedly both in-
side and outside the work environment. This makes it relatively
easy for them to build social ties, and provides a variety of
mechanisms to provide transfers and enforce punishment.
It is important to stress that we focus on the distinction
between collusion and “pure” altruism, namely that workers care
about others regardless of the others’ behavior. This is in contrast
to “reciprocal altruism” [Axelrod 1984; Fehr and Fischbacher
2002; Rabin 1993], whereby individuals are only altruistic toward
those who act altruistically toward them, and, thus, cooperate as
long as others cooperate. The key difference between collusion
and reciprocal altruism is that under the latter, cooperation is
sustained even in the last period of play. However, we cannot
exploit this particular prediction in distinguishing between col-
lusion and reciprocal altruism because we do not observe any
worker leaving the farm while relative incentives are still in
place.
The difficulty in separately purely altruistic from collusive
motives arises because factors that lead individuals to be more
altruistic toward each other, typically also facilitate collusion,
and vice versa. Here we exploit the fact that the ability to monitor
coworkers creates differences in observed behavior depending on
whether workers cooperate because of collusion or altruism. We
present evidence on workers’ productivity for another fruit type
whose physical characteristics are such that, unlike for the fruit
type studied so far, workers are unable to monitor the perfor-
mance of coworkers.
To sustain a collusive agreement, workers must necessarily
be able to monitor each other’s behavior on the field-day. In
contrast, the ability to monitor coworkers is irrelevant if workers’
behavior is driven by pure altruism. Under altruism, workers
take into account the effect their effort has on others because it
affects their own utility directly. Hence, they cooperate regardless
of whether they are monitored by others, and regardless of
whether they can monitor coworkers’ performance.
For the fruit type analyzed so far, monitoring others is cost-
less since workers work alongside one another. Workers are not
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physically separated and so can easily form accurate beliefs on
the performance of coworkers. To establish whether the ability to
monitor coworkers affects behavior, we analyze the effect on
individual productivity of the change in incentive schemes for
another fruit type, which we label type 2, as opposed to type 1
fruit that is the focus of the previous analysis.
Type 2 fruit grows on dense shrubs that are 6 to 7 feet high
on average. In contrast to type 1 fruit, when picking type 2 fruit
workers are unable to observe the quantity of fruit picked by
workers in neighboring rows on the field-day. Hence, the physical
characteristics of type 2 fruit ensure that workers cannot monitor
each other on the same field-day.
Over 80 percent of our sample workers pick type 2 fruit at
some point in the season. Of these workers, 54 pick under both
relative incentives and piece rates. Only these workers are used
in the analysis below. The two samples of workers—those who
pick type 1 fruit at least ten field-days under both incentive
schemes and those who pick type 2 fruit under both incentive
schemes—do not differ on observables, nor on their productivity
when picking type 1 fruit. Pickers of type 2 fruit are, however,
more likely to be female.
The number of workers who pick on the same field-day is
much smaller for type 2 fruit compared with type 1 fruit—the
average group size is nine under relative incentives and thirteen
under piece rates. Type 2 fruit is picked across twelve fields over
269 field-days. Of these, 112 occur under relative incentives, and
157 under piece rates. Worker productivity is 2.10 kg/hr under
relative incentives and 1.62 kg/hr under piece rates.33
To estimate the effect on individual productivity for type 2
fruit, zift, of the change in incentive schemes, we estimate the
following specification:
(15) zift  i  f  Pt  Xift  Zft  t  uift,
where Pt is a dummy equal to one when piece rates are in place
and zero otherwise. As in previous specifications we cluster the
disturbance terms by field-day, and we controls for time trend,
worker’s picking experience and the field life cycle. The latter two
are of course defined for type 2 fruit.
The results are presented in Table V. Column (1) reports that
33. The standard deviation of productivity under relative incentives and
piece rates is 1.07 and .95, respectively.
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in the baseline specification (15), there is no significant effect on
worker productivity moving from relative incentives to piece
rates. The pattern of the other coefficients is, however, similar to
the type 1 fruit.
The result suggests that when the production technology is
such that coworkers’ performance cannot be monitored, workers
do not internalize the externality they impose on others under
relative incentives; namely they are equally productive under
relative incentives and under piece rates.34
One possibility is that, in contrast to the average worker, this
34. Further analysis, not reported for reasons of space, shows that the result
is robust to restricting the sample to ten days either side of the change in
incentives. Moreover, results are robust to restricting the sample to field-days
where workers only picked type 2 fruit and performed no other tasks. We also find
that workers do not anticipate the change in incentives, and that piece rates have
no effect on productivity at any point of the season.
TABLE V
MONITORING
DEPENDENT VARIABLE  LOG OF WORKER’S PRODUCTIVITY
(KILOGRAM PICKED PER HOUR PER FIELD-DAY)
ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS REPORTED IN PARENTHESES, ALLOWING FOR CLUSTERING
AT FIELD-DAY LEVEL
(1) Fruit
type 2
(2) Fruit
type 1
(3) Fruit types
1 and 2
combined
Piece rate dummy (Pt) .063 .483***
(.129) (.094)
Piece rate  fruit type 2 .100
(.095)
Piece rate  fruit type 1 .490***
(.092)
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Field fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 .3015 .3777 .6098
Number of observations
(worker-field-day) 934 4224 5150
*** denotes significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. Robust standard errors are
calculated throughout, allowing for clustering at the field-day level in all columns. All continuous variables
are in logs. When picking fruit type 1 workers can monitor one another. When picking fruit type 2 workers
cannot monitor one another. The piece rate dummy is defined to be equal to zero when relative incentives are
in place, and one when piece rates are in place. Other controls include worker picking experience, field life
cycle, and a linear time trend. The sample in all columns is restricted to workers who have picked fruit type
2 at least once under both incentive schemes.
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particular subsample of workers simply do not cooperate, regard-
less of the monitoring technology. To check this, in column (2) we
reestimate the baseline specification for this subsample when
they pick type 1 fruit, where the behavior of coworkers can be
monitored. The results show that these workers cooperate as
much as workers in the larger sample when monitoring is feasi-
ble. The effect of the introduction of piece rates is significant and
of similar magnitude as in the larger sample.35
In column (3) we combine the observations across fruit types for
workers who pick both fruit types under both incentive schemes.
The result shows that there is a significant difference-in-difference
in the response of individual worker productivity to the introduction
of piece rates between fruit type 1 and fruit type 2.
Overall, the results indicate the effect of the change in in-
centives on worker productivity depends fundamentally on the
ability of workers to monitor their coworkers. When workers are
able to monitor each other (type 1 fruit), productivity is signifi-
cantly lower under relative incentives. In contrast, productivity is
identical under both schemes when workers cannot monitor each
other (type 2 fruit). Given that monitoring is necessary to enforce
collusion while it does not affect altruism, the comparison of
productivity by fruit type and incentive scheme rules out the
hypothesis that internalize the externality because they are
purely altruistic.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper provides evidence on social preferences by com-
paring workers’ productivity under a relative incentive scheme
with the productivity of the same workers under piece rates. Our
estimates indicate that moving from relative incentives to piece
rates causes productivity to rise by at least 50 percent for the
average worker. We show that the observed change in productiv-
ity is consistent with workers internalizing the externality their
effort imposes on coworkers to some extent. We also find that
workers internalize the externality to a greater extent when a
larger share of their coworkers are their close friends. Finally, we
find that workers internalize the externality only when they can
35. When this sample of workers picks fruit type 1, average productivity
under relative incentives is 4.80 kg/hr, and 8.01 kg/hr under piece rates. These are
not significantly different from the sample used for Table I.
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monitor others and be monitored. These results are among the
first to precisely identify an economic environment outside of the
laboratory, where behavior can be explained by individuals’ hav-
ing social preferences in reduced form.36
Throughout, we have taken the incentive schemes as given.
Our focus has been the response of workers to an exogenous
change in incentives and the implications for their underlying
preferences. A separate issue is whether the observed incentive
schemes are optimally designed by the principal. Two questions
arise. First, if the relative incentive scheme was so detrimental to
productivity, why was it ever adopted? Second, are piece rates
optimal in this context?
Regarding the use of relative schemes, the farm management
suggested that the relative scheme was mainly adopted to differ-
ence out common shocks that are a key determinant of workers
productivity in this setting.37
While this is in line with the predictions of incentive theory,
the superiority of relative incentives relies on the assumption
that workers ignore the externality their effort imposes on others.
Under these conditions the equilibrium effort choices under rela-
tive incentives and piece rates are approximately equal for large
group sizes. This assumption on worker behavior is not supported
in our data. Relative incentives led to lower productivity because,
perhaps surprisingly, workers internalized the negative external-
ity to some extent.
The finding that workers place a positive weight on their
coworkers’ payoffs also indicates that piece rates might not be
optimal in this context. To the extent that workers internalize
negative and positive externalities in a similar way, group incen-
tives, namely schemes where the worker’s pay and her coworkers’
performance are positively related, might elicit more effort at the
same cost to the principal. To explore this issue further, we use
our estimates of worker ability and social weights to simulate
effort levels under group incentives.
36. Relatedly, List [2004] compares the behavior of the sellers of baseball
cards in the laboratory and in the marketplace. He presents evidence that “local”
sellers (namely sellers who regularly operate in the market) display social pref-
erences both in the laboratory and in the market, especially when they interact
with buyers with whom they have a long-term relationship.
37. See Lazear and Rosen [1981], Green and Stokey [1983], and Nalebuff and
Stiglitz [1983]. Relative performance evaluation may also be preferred to piece
rates as it lowers informational rents to high types [Bhaskar 2002] and reduces
incentives of workers to exert effort in influence activity [Milgrom 1988].
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Under the two incentive schemes we observe in the data,
worker i’s compensation is webei, where w is some constant, e is
the average effort of the group, and ei is i’s own effort. Under
relative incentives b  1, and under piece rates b  0. We
illustrate the effect of group incentives within this class of com-
pensation schemes by setting b  0. While this need not be the
optimal group incentive scheme, it makes the comparison with
the observed schemes more transparent.
Figure VI shows average effort under these three classes of
incentive schemes where individual pay and group performance
are negatively correlated (relative incentives), uncorrelated
(piece rates), and positively correlated (group incentives). We
derive effort levels under the three alternative assumptions that
workers are self-interested (	  0), fully internalize the external-
ity (	  1), or have the average social weight derived in Section V
(	  .65). Throughout, we adjust the parameter w to hold the
total wage bill constant, and, for simplicity, we assume that
workers are of homogeneous ability.38
The figure shows that the three types of incentive scheme
yield the same level of effort only in the case of pure self-interest
(	  0). In line with the previous findings, when workers have
social preferences (	  0), effort is higher under piece rates than
under relative incentives. More interestingly, the figure also
shows that group incentives would, in this context, lead to higher
effort at the same total cost to the principal. The estimates
indicate that if 	  .65, average effort would increase by 30
percent moving from piece rates to a group scheme where indi-
vidual pay increases linearly in the average productivity of the
group (b  1).
The intuition for this is that since workers place positive
weight on other workers’ pay, the marginal benefit of effort is
higher when effort benefits their coworkers, other things equal.
To the extent that workers internalize the positive externality
38. We maintain the assumptions that workers’ benefit from pay x is ( x) 
x1/, and the disutility of effort is ei
2/ 2. The  parameter is set equal to its
average estimated value under piece rates, and N is set to 40. Worker’s compen-
sation is kept constant at c  4.5, the average hourly pay in Pounds Sterling. The
Nash equilibrium effort level as a function of b then is
e   c1/1  b1/N  	bN  1/N 
1/ 2
.
Note the effect of b—the relationship between individual pay and group perfor-
mance—on effort depends on the sign and the magnitude of the social weight 	.
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they impose on others, there is then a rationale for group incen-
tives even in settings where the production technology does not
exhibit complementarities.39
39. Rotemberg [1994] derives conditions under which group incentives are
optimal if workers are altruistic. Sen [1966] analyzes the allocation rule that leads
to Pareto efficiency in a cooperative whose workers place a positive weight on each
other’s material benefits. He shows that the optimal rule is a combination of
individual and group rewards. Roethlisberger and Dickson’s [1939] results from
FIGURE VI
Incentive Schemes and Effort, Holding Total Wage Bill Constant
Estimated Effort under the Three Incentive Schemes when 	  .65
Relative incentives:
b  1
Piece rates:
b  0
Group incentives:
b  1
Effort, estimated from
productivity data 1.66 2.82
Effort, calibrated 1.67 2.86 3.68
Kernel density estimates in Figure V are calculated using an Epanechnikov
kernel. The underlying benefit function is assumed to be
 x  2x1/ 2.
The total cost of effort is assumed to be quadratic in effort. Figure VI shows the
Nash equilibrium efforts for 	  0, .65, and 1, as a function of the parameter b in
the pay schedule:
pay  webei.
Throughout, the parameter w is adjusted to hold constant the total wage bill, and
N  40. We assume that workers have the same social weight (either 0, .65, or 1),
and are of homogeneous ability. The  parameter is set equal to its average
estimated value under piece rates.
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In conclusion, our analysis emphasizes that understanding
worker preferences is key for the optimal choice between alter-
native incentive schemes. Clearly, the magnitude of the effects
might be particularly large in our context because workers live
and work together and, thus, have both solid social ties and
access to a variety of punishment mechanisms. The findings
nevertheless show that to the extent that workers place some
weight, either positive or negative, on the effect of their actions on
the other workers’ pay, group or relative incentive schemes can
outperform piece rates in terms of productivity. The findings,
thus, provide specific insights for further developments of incen-
tive theory and shed new light on an old idea—the interplay
between social effects and the provision of incentives within
firms.40
APPENDIX 1: QUALITY AND QUANTITY
We present evidence to see whether the change in incentives
affected the quality of picking. To do so, we exploit the fact that
pickers are expected to classify fruit as either class 1—suitable as
supermarket produce, or class 2—suitable as market produce.
While picking, each worker is expected to put class 1 and class 2
fruit into two separate containers. Class 1 fruit is the most
common, accounting for 85 percent of the total weight of fruit
picked on an average day under relative incentives and 87 per-
cent under piece rates.
After fruit has been picked, it is transported to a cooled
warehouse for packing. In the packhouse each container passes
through a quality check. Whenever a class 2 fruit is detected in a
class 1 container, it is removed—downgraded—and transferred
to a class 2 container. By the time the fruit picked from a given
field-day arrives in the farm packhouse for inspection, however,
misclassification of fruit cannot be traced back to individual
workers. Moreover, since the electronic system used to record
the Hawthorne experiments showed that productivity increased significantly for
workers who were given group incentives and were allowed to socialize.
40. The idea that human relations affect workplace performance goes back to
Mayo [1933], Barnard [1938], Roethlisberger and Dickson [1939], and Roy [1952].
More recently, Kandel and Lazear [1992], Lazear [1989], Rotemberg [1994], and
Fershtman, Hvide, and Weiss [2003] have developed models incorporating social
concerns into the analysis of behavior within firms. Fehr and Fischbacher [2002]
discuss the experimental evidence on social preferences in firms.
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individual productivity data is not the same used to record mis-
classification at the field-day level in the packhouse, it is not
possible to match every field-day from the productivity and pack-
house databases. We are, however, able to retrieve quality infor-
mation for 67 field-day observations of which 29 are under rela-
tive incentives and 38 under piece rates.
In Appendix 2 we assess whether the trade-off between the
quality and quantity of picking changed significantly with the
change in incentives. We measure the quality of picking by the
quantity of class 2 fruit that is wrongly classified as class 1, as a
percentage of the total quantity of class 2 picked on a given
field-day. We scale this to be measured in percentage points
(0–100).
On average, 15 percent of class 2 fruit is misclassified as class
1 under relative incentives, and 12 percent under piece rates. The
difference between the two schemes is not significant.
Since class 1 fruit on average constitutes 85 percent of all
fruit picked, misclassifications are a negligible fraction of the
total kilograms of class 1 picked on a given day. On average, 2.32
percent of the total class 1 fruit received by the packhouse is
downgraded to class 2 under the relative scheme and 2.28 percent
under piece rates.
In column (1) we regress this measure of the quality of
picking on a dummy for the introduction of piece rates. In line
with the unconditional results we find that the share of misclas-
sified fruit falls by 3 percentage points, but the effect is not
precisely estimated. Including field fixed effects, column (2),
changes the sign of the piece rate coefficient, but the effect re-
mains statistically insignificant. The magnitude of the effect is
also quite small considering that on average there is five times as
much fruit of class 1 as there is of class 2. The estimates then
imply that the misclassified fruit as a share of the total of class 1
picked in a field-day increases by 0.4 percentage points.
In column (3) we additionally control for the quantity of class
1 fruit picked on the field-day and then also for a time trend and
its square. Finally, column (4) adds controls for the field life cycle,
and meteorological factors. We find that the level of misclassifi-
cation of fruit picked increases over time, but at a decreasing rate.
None of the other controls is significant. Our basic conclusion
remain unchanged—the coefficient of the piece rate dummy is
always small and not significantly different from zero.
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The productivity gains achieved under piece rates were not at
the expense of a lower quality of picking. Combined with the fact
that worker pay remained constant over the season, the change in
incentives unambiguously made the farm owners better off.
APPENDIX 2: THE EFFECT OF THE CHANGE IN INCENTIVES ON THE QUALITY
OF PICKING
DEPENDENT VARIABLE  KILOGRAMS OF CLASS 2 FRUIT MISCLASSIFIED AS CLASS 1
AS A SHARE OF TOTAL KILOGRAMS OF CLASS 2 ON THE FIELD-DAY
(PERCENTAGE POINTS 0–100)
ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS REPORTED IN PARENTHESES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Piece rate dummy (Pt) 3.39 2.08 2.19 2.02 2.71
(3.78) (2.90) (3.00) (4.20) (3.86)
Tons of class 2 fruit picked 
103
.016 .010 .009
(.010) (.010) (.011)
Time trend 1.02** .846*
(.438) (.463)
Time trend squared  103 .005** .005**
(.002) (.002)
Field life cycle 5.61 7.49
(10.5) (11.6)
Minimum temperature .190
(.584)
Maximum temperature .831
(.588)
Hours of sunshine .813
(.834)
Field fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .0142 .0929 .1125 .1702 .2156
Number of observations
(field-day)
67 67 67 67 67
*** denotes significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. Robust standard errors are
calculated throughout. The piece rate dummy is set equal to zero when relative incentives are in place, and
set equal to one when piece rates are in place. Data are based on the packhouse software system. It is
assumed that all fruit arrives in the packhouse two days after it is picked. The sample is restricted to those
fields that operated under both incentive schemes. All right-hand-side variables are lagged by two days to
allow for a time lag between picking and packing. Temperature variables correspond to a 0900–0900 time
frame. Hours of sunshine are measured daily.
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